Managing the Missile Defence’s Demise

  Autor :  Jan Jireš

The US missile defence project has always been a divisive issue both at home and abroad. Domestic critics of the project, which was vigorously promoted by the Bush administration, have questioned the technical feasibility of the proposed system as well as its cost-effectiveness.

 

Managing the Missile Defence’s Demise

The US missile defence project has always been a divisive issue both at home and abroad. Domestic critics of the project, which was vigorously promoted by the Bush administration, have questioned the technical feasibility of the proposed system as well as its cost-effectiveness. 

 

Many critics abroad have been preoccupied with broader political implications of the project. They worry that the delicate parity between the leading nuclear powers and the resulting situation of “mutually assured destruction” established during the Cold War will be ruined by a missile defence system, and that the planned deployment of the system’s components on the territory of Central European NATO allies will irritate Russia. It is rather ironic that they have succeeded in presenting their opposition to missile defence as a rejection of the “Cold War logic of arms race” and in accusing the supporters of the project of “Cold War mentality”.

 

The Obama administration is, of course, entitled to review the project it inherited and to evaluate its technical feasibility, economic sensibility and political desirability. It should, however, be aware of the fact that the debate about the project has long ago ceased to focus on its declared purpose (which is protecting the USA and NATO from missiles coming from unstable countries of Middle East and Asia) and has been transformed into a game heavily charged with political symbolism.

The course of the debate changed when Russian officials started to vigorously oppose the project and shifted it to a prominent position on their list of anti-West grievances. However, it has always been clear that the real challenge posed to Russia by the missile defence installations in Central Europe is not of a military character, as the Russian government officially argues, but of a purely symbolic character. Russians are frustrated by the fact they are no longer treated as a veto-wielding actor in Central European affairs. They also know that the Czech and Polish governments desire to participate in the project in order to strengthen their ties with the USA, to anchor America in Central European security, and to demonstrate that their countries are not in “Russia’s backyard” politically.

 

It makes little sense to quarrel about who deserves the blame for the fact that the missile defence project started to be discussed primarily in a rather old-fashioned context of great power competition over spheres of influence – whether it is the Bush administration, or the Russians, or the Czechs and Poles, or perhaps the feckless journalists. The real challenge now is: In case the Obama administration decides to abandon the project, it should do so cleverly and manage the process in a way securing political interests of the United States and its Central European allies.

 

There are two important things at stake. The first is the traditionally Atlanticist orientation of Central European allies. The second is the future of Russia’s foreign policy, especially in the country’s vicinity.

In the past two years, the Polish and Czech governments have invested tremendous political capital in supporting the missile defence project vis-à-vis sceptical public opinion at home and distrustful partners in the EU and NATO. Following Czech, Polish and American lobbying, NATO unanimously, though rather vaguely, endorsed missile defence as contributing to the alliance’s security. Last summer, after complicated and politically risky negotiations, both governments signed bilateral agreements with the United States allowing it to deploy missile defence components.

 

As a result of this prominence, abandoning the missile defence plan in a politically insensitive way can undermine not only these two strongly pro-American governments but also the very credibility of the Unites States as an ally. Countries are supposed to pursue foreign policies with certain degree of continuity, the very minimum being honouring formal commitments made by preceding governments – or being able to manage policy changes in such a way that they are not interpreted by friends and foes alike as selling out valuable allies. Mismanaging the demise of the missile defence project could deliver a fatal blow to Central European Atlanticism or, if you like, pro-Americanism.

 

The Obama administration must also avoid any impression that by scraping the missile defence installations the United States tacitly acknowledges Russia’s veto power over the foreign policies of Central European NATO members. That could seriously damage NATO’s cohesion as well as US leadership role in the alliance. 

 

Above all, no explicit trade-offs should be made between the United States and Russia over the heads of Central Europeans. Unfortunately, this is exactly how President Obama’s secret lettre d’amour to President Medvedev, recently reported on by the New York Times, looks like (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/washington/03prexy.html?_r=1&scp=4&sq=Czech&st=cse). The idea, outlined in the letter, of exploiting the fuss Russia created about missile defence to make the country supporting US pressure on Iran, is not new. Dennis Ross, Obama’s freshly appointed special adviser on Iran, proposed this tactics in his early 2008 article (http://www.tnr.com/politics/ story.html?id=2ff73f62-796c-4a28-9126-005c48b52717).

If he decides to abandon the missile defence project, President Obama should make sure that everyone understands it is purely because the technology does not work or because the system is objectively not needed. However, the secret US proposal to trade the abandonment of the project for Russia stopping its cooperation with Iran is exactly what will make Russia, Central Europe and the rest of the world concluding that Central Europeans are being relegated by the new US administration to the role of useful idiots in some cunning US-Russian plot. That is hardly in America’s interest.

 

Moreover, Dennis Ross’ idea seems to be based on a wrong reading of the motives behind Russia’s assertive foreign policy. The primary goal of Messrs Putin and Medvedev is to use foreign policy as one of the instruments helping legitimise their regime and its methods vis-à-vis the Russian population. In other words, they see foreign policy as a utilitarian public relations activity employed to score points with domestic audience, not to pursue predictable and legitimate national security goals. Under such volatile circumstances, it is unfounded to hope that sophisticated trade-offs such as the one proposed by President Obama will really work and be durable. And indeed, shortly after the letter appeared in public, President Medvedev rejected the US-proposed deal.

 

It is still possible that the “secret letter scoop” is a part of some clever scheme developed by the administration with the aim to push the Russians into the corner by demonstrating that they are unwilling to cooperate (or unable to deliver) on Iran even when the USA is ready to make substantial concessions, while the Central European allies were informed in advance about the plan and assured they were not going to be thrown overboard. If this is the case, hats off to the administration.

 

Jan Jires is a Ph.D. candidate at Charles University in Prague and a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the Center for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Intermational Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC.

 

Článek vyšel 6. března 2009 v rubrice PostGlobal na webové stránce deníku Washington Post.